Spectre of India: (Mis) Perceptions, (Mis) Representations and Racialized Ideology in US Foreign Policy during the Cold War
Introduction: Contextualizing Racialized Ideology and American Foreign
Policy
The main thrust of this paper is to highlight the intersection
of racialized ideology, found in
popular images in cinematic productions and textual discourses, and American
foreign policy making. Veering away from the mainstream and traditional
theories on foreign policy and international studies[1],
I specifically look into the images and iconography of India and its people
prevalent in American popular media, as manifestations as well as reproducers
of culture, during the Cold War, and how these influence the perceptions,
belief system and attitude of American policymakers toward India and
consequently, determine their choice of diplomatic policies with India. I argue
that the lack of knowledge of the Americans about the country, its history and
its people, or more precisely, the distorted image of India within the American
society, as evidenced by the predominance of negative images and derogatory narratives
about the Indians, juxtaposed with the sentiments of "white supremacy" vis-à-vis “Indian backwardness" inexorably resulted to poor US policies in
India and eventually to the rupture of Indo-US relations during the Cold War.
This paper largely draws from Michael
Hunt’s proposition that ideology, which compromises of the notion of racial
hierarchy, fear of revolution and the quest for “national greatness”, plays a crucial role in the US
foreign policy.[2] Focusing
particularly in the element of race, I shall, in the following section, present
the racialized images,
representations, and imaginations, about
India based on two key sources: [1] Harold Isaacs’ classic survey on American
images of India and [2] the British and Hollywood productions’ cinematic portrayals
of India. I shall subsequently explain how these racialized notions found their way into US foreign policy making
process during the Cold War by pointing out the parallel relationship between the
popular images of India and the descriptions of India utilized during the
formal deliberations among American legislators and key politicians concerning
particular foreign policy issues relating to India. In the last section, I
shall provide the implications of the inevitable permeation of (misconstrued)
ideological framework of race into foreign policy making to the study and
practice of foreign affairs.
Images of India through American
Eyes
Beginning
with the late 19th century until the end of the Second World War, American
diplomatic relations in Asia focused mainly on China, Japan and Southeast Asia while
India was pushed to the sidelines. During this period, the American public’s
gaze towards India was not as direct as it should be but rather India was
persistently seen as a fragment of the British Empire, a vantage point that was
inescapably filtered through the colonial lens. Graham Spry, who travelled to
India with Stafford Cripps, mentioned that “the
interest [of the American public] is
not primarily founded in India as India, but in British relations with India.” Ulysses
Grant, after his presidency, and Theodore Roosevelt, during his incumbency,
both regarded India as the most significant example of the success of the
British imperial supremacy. Roosevelt’s stance about India’s inferiority and
hence, the necessity of white
intervention to bring about progress, civilization and order in India is
evident in his statement, “if the British
control were withdrawn from India, the whole peninsula would become a chaos of
bloodshed and violence.”[3] For the majority of the Americans, including
leading legislators and politicians, knowledge about the distinctive culture
and traditions of India was meager – it was a mere “scratch in American mind” and as Harold Isaacs mentioned, “the marks left in the past by India [in
American society] are many fewer and much
fainter,” - that is in comparison with the marks left by Chinese images in
the American social memory.[4]
This lack of adequate comprehension
about India was precisely because of the paucity of, or the weakness in,
contact between the two countries – that ranges from the minimal diplomatic
relations, the mere snapshots of India as reflected in popular media either those
produced in the US or by the British, up to the invisibility of the Indians in American soil.[5]
Given this void in epistemic linkages, the predominant imaginations of India within the American public sphere necessarily
revolve around and formed out of sparse sources including literatures by
Rudyard Kipling and Katherine Mayo, British and Hollywood cinema, among others.
Given the elusive characterization of India for the American public, it is then
imperative to ask exactly who or what was India through the American eyes
during the years leading to and throughout the Cold War?
The majority of the Americans during
this period imagined India as a
distant exotic place, a mysterious foreign land, culturally divergent from
the US, full of mystics and ascetics, a place where poverty is widespread,
people are uneducated, undecipherable, and difficult to deal with, to name a
few. In Isaacs’ survey among 181 American respondents belonging to the educated
class, several indications of American imaginations
of India emerge: the fabulous Indians, the Indians as religious devotees
and philosophers, as benighted heathen, the lesser breed, the India based on
the Gandhi and Nehru images.
The notion of the “fabulous
Indians” was rooted in the age of European explorations, where the treasures of
the Indies attracted many adventurers
to navigate the high seas. The films The Rains
of Ranchipur (1955) and The Bengal Brigade (1954) presented images of the opulent maharajas turbaned and adorned with
jewels and gold and their magnificent white palaces and many servants. Juxtaposed
with this is the image of the religious and mystics of India - the people
deemed as motivated by their inexplicable
religion in their everyday life, as philosophical in nature, and contemplative;
the images of Buddha and various deities of Hinduism stirred the imaginations about India as the land of
impractical, irrational and illogically devout ascetics, starving themselves to
death and squandering hours in meditation. India was also viewed by the Americans
as the benighted heathen – the fanatics, who worship a sacred cow, phallic
symbols and bizarre idols; believers in superstitions and members of religious
cults. In Isaacs’ survey, out of the 181 respondents, 137 Americans revealed
negative attitude towards the religious practices, rituals and belief system of
the Indians.
Accordingly, the Americans looked
at the Indians, relative to themselves, as the lesser breed – Kipling’s poems and short stories depict the white supremacy over the dark-skinned,
backward and subhuman Indians and in his own words, the Indians as “half-devil and half-child.”[6]
Katherine Mayo’s published book also became a prominent source of American
images of India and the India that she constructed was one of “helplessness, lack of initiative, lack of
initiative and originality, lack of staying into power, and sustained
loyalties, sterility of enthusiasm, weakness of life vigor itself.”[7]
In that same book, Mayo presented images of India that is full of misery and
extreme destitution - that a newly born Indian child’s first feeding is in fact
consist of “crude sugar mixed with the
child’s own urine.”[8]
These vivid narratives became deeply entrenched among the American public.
Finally, India was remembered and
understood based on the two important personalities that, to a certain degree, came
to be the faces of India. They are none other than Mahatma Gandhi and
Jawaharlal Nehru. The political influence of these two personas need no further
explanation, suffice to say that they became the essential and memorable icons
that represented India not only to the American public, but to the whole world
as well. On the one hand, the Gandhi image, Isaacs explained, was generally
positive. In fact, 141 out of 144 interviewees agreed that Gandhi was an
admirable man – the symbol of non-violence and passivity of India, the leader
of India’s independence movement, a man of devotion, strong conviction,
dedication, wisdom, profound spirituality, humility, and the list goes on.
On the other hand, the Nehru image
was depicted as more human than Gandhi. His name and face emerge as the vital
representation of the post-independent India – triumphant in their struggle for
freedom but held back in the numerous crises and dilemmas during the early
years as an autonomous nation. Nehru carried with him the aura of being a
strong statesman, advocate of freedom, an intellectual and perhaps, more
significantly, the leader of the non-aligned movement and since he took the
reins of running the affairs of India in the emergent context of the Cold War. I
will discuss more details about American views of Nehru’s India in the
succeeding section, what is noteworthy as this juncture is that Nehru, as the
key political figure of India to the international affairs, partially determined
how the rest of the world saw India, consequently, how the Americans view Nehru
also determined how they view India.
To establish congruence and
corroboration between Isaacs’ findings and the prevailing representations of
India that circulated and therefore influenced American beliefs about the
Indians, I utilize the overriding images from British and Hollywood cinemas
about India and its people. I specifically chose films because of its capacity
to generate lucid portrayals or images that can be almost immediately absorbed
by the audience, its power to reach as many audience or observers as possible,
and its faculty to create images that would form a part of the observer’s
consciousness and understanding and simultaneously reinforce the society’s dominant
ideologies. A brief survey of widely held films screened in the US reveal the
perpetuation of the same unrelenting impressions of India as remote, exotic, spiritual, mysterious, and so on.
In his book, Ananda Mitra probes
into Western created cinemas and the emerging images of India embedded in them
to capture how Westerners perceive India and how they choose to represent in
cinematic pictures what they perceive about India.[9]
Using British and Hollywood films, the earliest were from the 1930s and the most
recent from the 1990s, Mitra examines four elements or what he calls the set of
crisis that help constitute the image of India – in terms of geography,
religion, tradition and the history of colonization. The representations of
these elements do not necessarily correspond to the realities of India but they
do correspond directly to the dominant ideology within which the cinema was
produced.[10]
Firstly, India, based on films, is constantly
portrayed as a place characterized by duality – on one hand, it is full of picturesque
mountains, waterfalls, jungles full of wild predators and virgin forests, as
seen in The Man Who would be King (US,
1975) and on the other hand, of crowded cities, swarming thugs and dangerous
urban spaces as in the film Salaam Bombay!
(UK, 1988) – either way reflecting the sense of precariousness of its
geography to outsiders.[11]
Secondly, India is depicted as the abode of, yet again, exotic, peculiar and sinister religions as seen in Gunga Din (US, 1939) and Around the World in 80 Days (US, 1956).[12]
In illustrating India as such, Western filmmakers not only produce a strange
representation of the foreign and alien society that was India but creates the
necessary space by which Western audience can immediately establish their
position in relation to the subject, a process of othering, of building the image of the other relative to the self
and in so doing, defining the role of the self.
Thirdly, the images of specific traditions to capture India is inherently
linked to religion – India’s images in films corresponds to the practices and
rituals that highlight the primitiveness
of the Indian society, the immoral values
that results from their strange religious beliefs, their idiosyncratic
lifestyle such as eating of snakes and monkey’s brains, as demonstrated in Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom (US,
1984).[13]
Finally, India is depicted as inseparable from its colonial past and
consequently, its white masters - in
this case, the image that form India emerges from the binary characterizations of
the colonizer and the colonized, of the superior British and the inferior Indians
as evidenced in the film Heat and Dust (UK,
1983), Bhowani Junction (UK-US,
1956), and A Passage to India (UK,
1984).[14]
At this juncture, it is important
to point out that the perceptions about India prevalent based on Isaacs’ survey
and an analysis of British and Hollywood cinemas, as I will explain further in
the next section, were not divorced from the dominant ideology (of racial
hierarchy) of the American society and the formal political processes of the
state. The emergent representations of India are manifestations of the racialized ideology of the Americans
while at the same time bearing the power to reproduce that very same racialized ideology. For the American
audience who knew very little about India, popular media such as films,
newspapers, and music, produce particular patterns and regularized images that subsequently
form part and parcel of the American society’s notion about the “genuine” Indian
identity and as a consequence shape their belief system, behavior and attitude
towards India and the Indians. Policy makers and legislators are not impervious
from these webbed processes of ideological constructions and consistent
perpetuation of coherent images. As aforementioned, prior to the Cold War, the
American public, including their foreign policy decision-makers were
unacquainted about India, it was an
epitome of foreignness and the exotic other and they rely on the images
of India that were recurrent in public culture to the understand it, make sense
of it and thus, behave toward it. In the next section, I shall establish how
the popular American images of India pervade the debates and deliberations
about three specific US foreign policy issues pertaining to India: the American
economic aid to India, the Non-Alignment Movement and finally India’s nuclear
weapons build-up.
From Racial
Discourses to Policy Outcomes
In
his book, Hunt contends that the elements of race, national greatness and fear
of revolution that constitute American ideology shaped the discourse of the
country’s foreign policy. He asserts that the Americans utilized the notions
racial hierarchy to “build protective
walls against the threatening strangeness of other people”[15] and
that very same ideology, as complemented by the two other aforementioned
elements, influenced US policies in China, Japan, Latin America and the
annexation of the Philippines. Despite his disclaimer that there is no
clear-cut connection or guaranteed direct correspondence between ideology and
the policy outcomes, acknowledging that while policies may, at the outset, be
determined by ideology, other non-ideological factors shape the final form of
the policies as well, he nevertheless emphasize the relevance of understanding
the ideological foundations of US foreign policy.[16]
It is within this framework that I ensconce
my analysis of how racialized ideology of
India affects American policy outcomes – the persistence racialized images and descriptions of India in policy debates during
the Cold War strengthen Hunt’s proposition.
American
Economic Aid to India: Saving the Lesser Breeds from Starvation
It is imperative to note at this
juncture that post-independence India faced a multitude of political, economic
and social predicaments and that one of the direst of its problems was that of
economic stagnation and severe poverty. The sporadic skirmishes against
Pakistan aggravated by a series of adverse calamities escalated India’s
problem, pushing the country to confront a huge deficit in food grains of up to
two million tons by 1951. Given the gravity of the situation, India had to look
towards the US for assistance. Since the US did not immediately respond to
Nehru’s first informal request for food assistance in 1949, a decision that was
perceived not only by the Indians but by Americans as well as a failure of
American humanitarianism, India’s second appeal for assistance in 1951 was
keenly considered. Should the US once again fail to respond positively to the
request, it would immediately renegade the US as epitome of greed and
cold-bloodedness. Furthermore, Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee
pointed out that public support would be clearly stimulated on humanitarian
grounds than the strategic reasons for granting aid to India. As such, US
assistance to India was described as a “generous
project to prevent starvation in a country plagued by natural disasters.”[17] On
December 1, 1950, the Department of State issued a policy statement which
states categorically that India had to necessarily depend on outside help, that
being the US, to quell what they described as “grinding poverty, starvation and sickness.”[18]
Despite this, the deliberations in
Capitol Hill concerning US aid to India were still beleaguered with conflicting
positions as legislators such as Sen. Tom Connolly found it a waste to send aid
to a country who clearly did not side with the US on various international
issues.[19]
He claimed, “Of course they are to say
that there are a lot of people that are going to starve if you don’t hurry up
and give them some wheat.”[20] Nehru’s opposition against American
actions in Korea further raised criticisms and questions whether to grant 2
million tons of food grain to India. A number of American legislators felt that
it would be better to grant aid to other poorer nations who openly sided with
the US than to India, who seemed to be working against them. Alexander Wiley
suggested that US take a practical stance, “we
are going to do charity where charity is done, but when there is no need for
charity, when our own people had to pay the bill, we owe our people some
responsibility.”[21]
Nevertheless, there was an impetus
as well to provide aid on the ground that it was morally imperative for the US to “save” the starving Indians which
was consistent with the image that the Americans held about the country. In
order to sway the opinion of American policy makers, Acheson even compelled the
US Embassy in India to provide graphic materials that capture deaths,
sufferings, the impacts of food deficiency as well as distraught areas.[22]
Through American eyes, India was an image of sheer destitution, of people dying
of hunger or sickness, beggars, fleas, and millions of homeless sleeping on the
streets. President Eisenhower confirmed this image and described how he
witnessed what poverty was like in India. “Dwellings
were constructed of mud. Modern sewage, lighting, and running water were, of
course, nonexistent. Houses were virtually unfurnished.[23] Mr. Robert Fluker vividly illustrated how “the last hopes for good harvest…vanished” due
to a series of calamities - heavy rains in Bihar, earthquakes in Assam, locust
infestations in Rajputana and floods in Punjab.[24]
There were repeated cautions that millions would starve in India and this
strikes at the heart of American humanitarian idea that no man should be
allowed to starve, more importantly given that the US had the capacity to help
out India.
This appealed to American sense of
morality and white man’s burden, from
the public to the legislators, that if they do not extend help and “if, as is probable, millions die of
starvation, we shall find it difficult to live with our own consciences.”[25]
For Dean Acheson the refusal of grant to India would run counter to American
traditions.[26]
Newspaper editorials as well various American organizations, including YMCA,
the Friends Service Committee, and the National Council of Churches, supported
the aid measure.[27] The Washington Post stated, “If a catastrophe is to be prevented, aid
will have to be forthcoming from the United States…The food ought to be granted
and quickly.”[28] The lucid representations of deprivation in India as
well as the threat of millions dying of hunger, in fact, further strengthened
the carried perceptions of the American society about India as a land of perils
and penury. This image compelled the Americans to bestow aid. From the 1950s up
until the 1960s, India became the biggest recipient of American aid, amounting
to $10 billion.
The Non-alignment
Policy: Symptom of India’s Immorality
One
of the most critical issues that fractured Indo-Us relations during the Cold
War was Nehru’s decision to declare the non-alignment policy and to keep “as far as possible…away from the power
politics of groups, aligned against one another.”[29] Nehru
advocated for countries in Asia to adopt a non-aligned stance so that the
region would never again be an arena for Western power’s competition. He
asserted that, “The countries of Asia can
no longer be used as pawns by others; they are bound to have their own policies
in world affairs.”[30] Although
in theory, non-alignment entails the autonomy of India in determining its own
foreign relations, in practice, India, during Nehru’s leadership tilted towards
the Soviet Union.[31]
This decisive move on the part of India was skeptically viewed by the Americans
as a major impediment to US efforts to assemble nations of Asia in the struggle
against the Soviet world domination. More so, neutralism, as much as it clashed
with US policy of containment, was in fact deemed as immoral. American officials could not comprehend why a seemingly
moral Indian person, based on the image of the Indians as spiritual and devout
people, as Nehru could not realize morality
of the US position in the context of the Cold War.[32]
Furthermore, India’s non-alignment
was often used as an indisputable exemplar of the “flexible Indian mind.”[33] For
the American society who viewed the Indians as passive, illogical and
irrational people, non-alignment was a result of the ambiguity and weakness of
the “Hindu mind.”[34] Chester
Bowles said that India’s opinion about the Communist threat was partly due to
the “illogical sense of security” led
them to rationalize that the conflict formed out of American fear and
inexperience.[35] For the
American society, “people in India could
not think straight, and could not move logically from one from to another.”[36] President
Eisenhower himself described Nehru as someone who is more persuaded by
personality than by a logical argument.[37]
Moreover, for the Americans, non-alignment was not only unreasonable, it is
also demonstrated the supreme, unfounded idealism and childishness of India.[38] Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,
who was known as for his unsympathetic perceptions about India, disputed that non-alignment
itself was impossible. He contended that the defense treaties that the US
signed and concluded with other countries, in actuality, negate the notion of
neutrality. He further claimed that neutrality “has increasingly become an obsolete conception, and except under very
exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and short-sighted conception.”[39]
India’s
non-aligned stance stirred criticisms in the US particularly during the
deliberations for additional economic aid to India. For some legislators such
as Sen. William Knowland, it would not be good for the reputation of the US to
remunerate the non-aligned stance of India. Similarly, William Jenner
questioned the proposed aid to India “when
India is admittedly neutral in the irresponsible conflict between human dignity
and human slavery.”[40] Washington
was even more annoyed when some countries under Nehru’s Non-aligned Movement
were parading a “distinct pro-Moscow
slant.”[41] Washington’s
detest against India’s non-aligned policy was seen in US continued support to
Pakistan and that further widened the gap between US and Indian relations. Secretary
Dulles defended Pakistan’s special status because it was the largest Muslim
country that was a reliable defense against the spread of Communism to Asia.[42]
This view was confirmed by a Pakistani diplomat who assured the Americans that “Pakistan will fight to the last man against
Communism.”[43]
Rather than deal with India properly, US chose to favor Pakistan who was
more than willing to be America’s “ally” in South Asia – a move that further
embittered the relations between India and the US. Pakistan became a member of
the Baghdad Pact (later known as CENTO) and it received significant amount of
American economic as well as military assistance until the mid-1960s.[44]
India’s Nuclear Build-Up: Wayward Mutiny of
Begging Bowls
India’s
nuclear detonation which occurred on May 18, 1974, and its continued weapons
build-up thereafter, was another throbbing strain to the faltering Indo-US
relations during the Cold War. Despite the clear statement in a telegram from
Charge d-Affaires Schneider to the Secretary of State, that the incident was
characterized by the Indian government as a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” it
stirred negative reactions from the American populace. The American public’s
opinion was one of dismay and incredulity that a country facing massive poverty
wasted their meager resources to
develop nuclear devices. A New York Times
editorial stated that it was as unacceptable that India “squandered on the vanity of power, while
600 million Indians slip deeper into poverty.”[45] The US threatened to cut all aids to India, a
resolution to totally abscond assistance to India was even introduced in
Congress, and fuel shipments to a nuclear plant in Tarapur were brought to a
halt until international safeguards have been secured.
For the US Congress it was
ridiculous that a country begging for surplus wheat and food grains, decided
not only to arm itself with nuclear capabilities but to flaunt it to the world
by detonating it. Some of the members of the US Congress saw that there was
absolutely no reason for American tax payers to give assistance to India. There
were initiatives from Rep. Stanford Parris and Sen. Marlow Cook to end all
foreign aid to India until it became an official signatory of the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Clearly, Katherine Mayo’s India was still powerfully engrained in
the minds of the Americans. The Indian’s mind, Mayo states, has a very limited
capacity, “their minds as a rule do not
turn to the accumulation of things. They are content with their mud huts…given
ample space, they crowd into a closet…rather than work harder for more food,
they prefer their ancient measure of leisure and just enough food for the day.”[46] They stereotyped the Indians as lazy,
slothful, indolent and irresponsible – precisely the kind of people who are not
entitled to acquire a weapon as critical as a nuclear bomb. India remained to
be an image of extreme poverty and overpopulation, and as Paul Erlich
described, “The streets seemed alive with
people. People eating, people washing, people sleeping. People visiting,
arguing and screaming. People thrusting their hands through the taxi window,
begging.”[47]
Although the US government
recognized that the cost of India’s nuclear testing was minimal, the further development
of nuclear weapons would, in fact, be very expensive and would divert limited
resources that could be spent more efficiently in their badly needed social and
economic developments.[48]
US had made it clear to India that it will not tolerate any testing of nuclear
weapons including those termed as “peaceful nuclear explosion.” It was seen not
only as a destabilizing factor in South Asia but also poses a concern for the
US who was practically ignored the views of the US. The test also comes at a time
when India was seeking for additional economic and food grain assistance from
the US. The sentiment that any assistance given to India would be diverted to
nuclear build-up and that contradicts their image of India – they are poor and
miserable therefore, they could not afford to be armed with nuclear.[49]
Conclusion:
(Mis) Perceptions, (Mis) Representations, and Foreign Policy-Making
I
have demonstrated, albeit succinctly, how racialized
discourse about India shaped the way the American society behave towards
the Indians, and in the realm of foreign policy making, how (mis)perceptions
and (mis)representations about the Indians influenced policies and attitude of
American decision-makers. It has been my purpose to contribute to literatures
by authors such as Michael Hunt, Servando Halili, Kristin Hoganson, Rubin
Francis Weston and Akira Iriye who have explored more extensively and more
profoundly, the function of culture and ideology in studying foreign relations.[50]
Through this paper, I concur with their findings that foreign policy decisions
are not wholly carved out of realist objectives or is it a mere product of the
structural framework of the state, but it is in point of fact, not divorced
from ideology and culture (or social psychology which is still embedded within
culture). I do not, however, make a case that ideology is the fundamentally the
one and the only factor that determine foreign policy decisions. As Hunt
explicated, and I surmise, non-ideological considerations form part as well in
the process of diagnosing and selecting policies that the state implements in
world affairs. It is however, crucial to emphasize, for the purpose of this
paper, that adequate attention must be given to the examination of ideologies
that permeate the society and the state and consequently determine foreign
policy decisions. The reasons for this are simple. First, understanding the ideological
processes at work within a state gives a better insight of how the state and
its people generally perceive other people
in relation to their self, and in so
doing, we get a better sense of the reasons for their attitude and behavior.
Secondly, ideology as inherently entrenched within a culture provides a
narrower tool by which one can identify the distinctive nuances and peculiarities
of a specific country’s demeanor in international affairs. Thirdly, it is
imperative for policy makers to realize and comprehend how their personal
ideology can, as a matter of fact, influence the way they evaluate issues and
problems so that they would be better equipped to question where their opinions
and judgments on foreign policy matters are coming from and thus, they would be
more prudent and cautious in their decisions.
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Public Documents
[1] Mainstream
IR theories include realist, liberalist, neo-realist, economic interpretations,
and bureaucratic politics, among others.
[2] Hunt
defines ideology as “an interrelated set
of convictions and assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular
slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways
of dealing with that reality.”
[3] H.W.
Brands, India and the United States: The
Cold Peace (Boston, Twayne Publishers, 1990), p. 3.
[4] Harold
Isaacs, Scratches on our Minds (New York: The John Day Company, 1958).
[5] The only
significant contact between India and the US before the Cold War occurred in
the 1830s. There was an influx of American missionaries to various places in
the subcontinent who were committed to proselytizing the Indians, whom they
described as heathens, backward and uncivilized. Brands (1990), p. 2.
[6] Charles
H. Heimsath, “The American Images of India as Factors in US Foreign Policy
Making” in Michael Krenn (ed.) Race and
US Foreign Policy during the Cold War (London: Garland Publishing, Inc.,
1998), p. 274.
[7] H.W.
Brands, India and the United States, p.
7.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ananda
Mitra, Through the Western Lens: Creating
National Images in Film, (New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1999).
[10] Ibid.,
pp. 152-179.
[11] Ibid.,
pp. 155-161.
[12]. Ibid.,
pp. 161-166.
[13] Ibid.,
pp. 166-167.
[14] Ibid.,
pp. 172-177.
[15] Hunt
[16] Hunt, p.
16.
[17] Memorandum
by the Assistant Secretary of the State for Near Eastern, South Asian and
African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of the State, Washington, DC, January
30, 1951. Foreign Relations of the United
States, Volume 6, p. 2106.
[18] Department
of State Policy Statement, Washington December 1, 1950. Foreign Relations of the United States 1950, Volume 5, pp.
1477-1478.
[19] Arthur
Rubinoff, “Changing Perceptions of India in the US Congress” in Asian Affairs, p. 42.
[20] Brands,
India and the United States, p. 56.
[21] Ibid.,
57.
[22] Telegram
of the Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, January 24, 1951. Foreign Relations of the United States 1952,
Volume 6, p. 2090.
[23] Charles
Heimsath, “The American Images of India as Factors in US Foreign Policy Making”
in Michael Krenn (ed.) Race and US
Foreign Policy during the Cold War (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc,
1998), p. 279.
[24] Foreign
Relations 1951, Volume 6, p. 2085.
[25]
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of the State for Near Eastern, South
Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State, January 30, 1951.
Foreign relations of the United States,
Volume 6, p. 2097.
[26] Foreign
Relations, Volume 6, p. 2110.
[27] Robert
McMahon, “Food as a Diplomatic Weapon: The India Wheat Loan of 1951” in Pacific Historical Review, Volume 56 No.
3, (Aug. 1987), p. 359.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Brands,
India and the United States, p. 47.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Brian
Shoup and Sumit Ganguly, introduction to US-Indian
Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century: More than Words. (London:
Routledge, 2006), p. 2.
[32] Antony
Best, et al., International History of
the Twentieth Century and Beyond Second Edtion, (London: Routledge, 2008),
pp. 318, 320.
[33]
Heimsath, “The American Images of India,” p. 275.
[34] Ibid.,
p. 274.
[35] Memorandum
by the Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi,
December 6, 1951, Foreign Relations of
the United States 1951, Volume 6, p. 2192.
[36] Rotter,
Comrades at Odds, p. 83.
[37] Letter
from the President to the Secretary of State, Washington, March 23, 1955,
Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, Volume VIII.
[38] Best, International History, p. 320.
[39] Cecil
Crabb, Jr. “American Diplomatic Tactics and Neutralism” in Political Science Quarterly, Volume 78, No. 3 (Sept., 1963), p.
426.
[40] Ibid., p.
83.
[41] Strobe
Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy,
Democracy and the Bomb (Washington DC.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004),
p. 10.
[42] Ibid., p.
422.
[43] Brands,
India and the United States, p. 73.
[44] Stephen
Cohen, India: Emerging Power, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 270.
[45] Heimsath,
“The American Images of India,” p. 286.
[46] Rotter,
Comrades at Odds, p. 80.
[47]
Heimsath, “The American Images of India”, p. 286.
[48]
Response to National Security Study Memorandum 156, Washington, Sept. 1, 1972,
p. 10.
[49] 62. Telegram from the Department of State to the
Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency, May 18, 1974.
[50] See:
Servando Halili, Iconography of the New
Empire Race and Gender Images and the
American Colonization of the Philippines. (Quezon City: University of the
Philippines Press, 2000); Kristin Hoganson, Fighting
for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and
Philippine-American Wars, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); and
Rubin Francis Weston, Racism in US
Imperialism: The Influence of Racial Assumptions on American Foreign Policy
1893-1946, (US: University of South Carolina Press, 1972).
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